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TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT MARKETS: 
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND 
COERCED COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION IN 
UNITED FOODS, ZAUDERER, AND ABOOD  
Robert Post* 
In recent years the Court has decided three cases that address the 
compelled subsidization of commercial speech.  Each of these cases 
involves a federal statute that creates an industry board empowered to 
tax producers of a specific agricultural product in order to promote and 
stabilize the market in that product.  Taken together, the decisions in this 
trilogy evidence manifest and disturbing confusion about the 
constitutional status of commercial speech.  At stake in this confusion is 
the extent to which First Amendment protections for commercial speech 
will invalidate regulations that now routinely require commercial actors 
to disclose information to promote transparent and efficient markets. 
The first case in the trilogy was Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & 
Elliott,1 which was decided in 1997.  Glickman upheld a federal marketing 
program that required private parties to subsidize an advertising 
campaign for California summer fruits.  Dismissing claims that this 
mandated subsidization amounted to compelled speech in violation of 
the First Amendment, the Court in a narrow five-to-four opinion held 
that “[o]ur compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable to the 
regulatory scheme at issue here.”2  Four years later, however, the Court 
reversed course and in United States v. United Foods, Inc.3 struck down a 
similar program designed to promote and stabilize the market in fresh 
mushrooms.  The Court held that “First Amendment concerns apply” 
whenever the state requires persons to “subsidize speech with which 
they disagree.”4  This holding revolutionized First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the area of the compelled subsidization of speech, 
                                                 
*  David Boies Professor Law, Yale Law School.  I am grateful for the unceasing and 
generous assistance of David Newman, Matt Spence, Rob Wiygul, and Mark Wu. 
1 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
2 Id. at 470. 
3 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
4 Id. at 410–11. 
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sparking a cascade of challenges to agricultural government marketing 
programs in the lower courts.5   
Most recently, the Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n6 
turned yet another about-face.  In the context of a program to promote 
the market in beef products that was “on all fours with United Foods,”7 
the Court held that because “compelled funding of government speech 
does not alone raise First Amendment concerns,”8 and because the beef 
advertisements produced by the program were government speech, the 
program was immune from First Amendment challenge based upon 
claims of compelled subsidization of speech.  Johanns went out of its way 
to offer a generous and encompassing definition of government speech9 
that seemed deliberately designed to end the many challenges that after 
United Foods had engulfed government agricultural marketing programs. 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2004) (Louisiana 
Alligator Resource Fund), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263 
(3d Cir. 2004) (Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983), vacated sub nom. Lovell v. 
Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005), and Johanns v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2512 (2005); Mich. Pork 
Producers Ass’n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003) (Pork Promotion, Research and 
Consumer Info. Act), vacated sub nom. Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family 
Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005), and Johanns v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511 
(2005); Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 318 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(California Table Grape Comm’n); In re Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 257 F. Supp. 2d 
1290 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (Washington State Apple Commission); Charter v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Mont. 2002), vacated, 412 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2005); Gerawan 
Farming, Inc. v.  Kawamura, 90 P.3d 1179 (Cal. 2004); Dep’t of Citrus v. Graves Bros. Co., 
889 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, Fla. Dep’t of Citrus v. Graves Bros. Co., 912 
So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2005). 
6 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005). 
7 Id. at 2070 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
8 Id. at 2062. 
9 “When, as here, the government sets the overall message to be communicated and 
approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the 
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental 
sources in developing specific messages.”  Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063. 
Here, the beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more 
than adequate to set them apart from private messages.  The program 
is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and 
specific requirements for the promotions’ content are imposed by 
federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment.  The 
Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the 
program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains 
absolute veto power over the advertisements’ content, right down to 
the wording.  And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not 
to mention the ability to reform the program at any time.  No more is 
required. 
Id. at 2064. 
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Johanns is very narrowly written.  It does not in any way undermine 
or limit the reasoning of United Foods in cases that do not involve 
government speech.  That reasoning has fundamentally altered received 
First Amendment doctrine in at least three respects: 
1. United Foods states that First Amendment 
questions are raised whenever government forces 
“individuals to pay subsidies for speech to 
which they object.”10  
2. United Foods holds that courts should carefully 
review statutes that require the compelled 
subsidization of commercial speech. 
3. United Foods holds that serious First 
Amendment questions are raised whenever the 
state compels persons to associate with an 
organization whose primary purpose is to 
engage in commercial speech. 
Each of these propositions is novel, and each is in my view seriously 
misguided.  One obvious implication of the first proposition is that 
courts ought rigorously to review the use of tax dollars to support 
government speech.  This implication was so radical that the Court felt 
impelled in Johanns immediately to intervene to disavow it.  I discuss the 
errors implicit in the first proposition elsewhere,11 and I shall not repeat 
that critique here.   
In this Lecture I shall instead focus on the jurisprudential difficulties 
created by the second and third innovative propositions advanced by 
United Foods.  I shall argue that these innovations implicitly re-evaluate 
the constitutional status of commercial speech by shifting the focus of 
constitutional analysis from the circulation of information to the 
independent interests of commercial speakers to speak or to associate.  It 
is evident that United Foods did not carefully consider the implications of 
this shift for the general structure of commercial speech doctrine or for 
the pervasive regimes of regulation that now envelop commercial 
speech.  Taken to its logical conclusion, the shift is so potentially 
destabilizing that it is unlikely to be sustained in anything like the pure 
form in which it is expressed in United Foods.   
                                                 
10 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001). 
11 Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech:  Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 195 (2006). 
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My objective in this Lecture is to make explicit the potential 
consequences of the second and third innovations of United Foods, in the 
hope that we may in the future avoid the kind of doctrinal uncertainty 
and embarrassment that has unfortunately already plagued the 
Glickman-United Foods-Johanns triology.    
I.  COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH BEFORE UNITED FOODS 
The Court first held that the Constitution protected commercial 
speech in 1976, when in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.12 it overruled prior precedent13 to decide 
that the First Amendment constrained state regulation of commercial 
advertising.  From the outset the Court insisted that “[o]ur jurisprudence 
has emphasized that ‘commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of 
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that 
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’”14  
Although content-based regulations of public discourse are subject to 
strict scrutiny, content-based restrictions of commercial speech are 
subject to review under the relatively more lenient terms of the so-called 
Central Hudson test:  
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis 
has developed.  At the outset, we must determine 
whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within 
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity 
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.15 
                                                 
12 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
13 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no . . . 
restraint on government” regulation of “purely commercial advertising.”). 
14 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).  In recent years, this black-letter proposition has become 
contestable.  Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The 
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
15 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  The 
Court has applied the Central Hudson test in radically inconsistent ways.  Compare, e.g., 
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Commercial speech receives diminished constitutional protection 
because “[t]he First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is 
based on the informational function of advertising.”16  Whereas 
communication within “public discourse”17 is protected both because of 
its participatory value to a speaker and because of its informational value 
to an audience,18 “[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally 
protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as 
because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial 
information.’”19  
In 1985 in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,20 the Court used 
this explanation of the constitutional status of commercial speech as the 
premise for its analysis of the problem of mandatory commercial 
disclosures.  At issue in Zauderer was a government requirement that 
speakers include information in their advertisements in order to avoid 
deceiving consumers.  The case involved the constitutionality of a 
Disciplinary Rule of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility 
providing that lawyers could advertise contingent fee rates only if they 
disclosed “whether percentages are computed before or after deduction 
of court costs and expenses.”21  Because this Disciplinary Rule required 
lawyers to speak in ways that they would have preferred to avoid, 
Zauderer was required to address the question of compelled commercial 
speech. 
Zauderer acknowledged that compelled speech within the realm of 
public discourse raised serious constitutional questions, as the Court had 
                                                                                                             
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), with Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).  More than a majority of the Justices have at one time or another 
indicated their dissatisfaction with the test.  See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484 (1996).  Yet the Court has continued to apply the test with increasing severity.  See, 
e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); Greater New Orleans Bd. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 183 (1999). 
16 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563; see Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial 
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000); see also Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First 
Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 384 (1979). 
17 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1986); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 
802 (1985). 
18 For a discussion, see Post, supra note 16. 
19 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). 
20 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
21 Id. at 633. 
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ruled in precedents like West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,22 in 
which schoolchildren were required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, 
and Wooley v. Maynard,23 in which a Jehovah’s witness was required to 
display the state motto of New Hampshire on the license plate of his 
automobile.  Zauderer found that compelled commercial speech was 
different, however, because the regulation of commercial speech did not 
implicate constitutional “interests . . . of the same order as those 
discussed in Wooley . . . and Barnette.”24  The Court explained that 
“[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides,” a speaker’s “constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in 
his advertising is minimal.”25   
Zauderer accordingly advanced an extraordinarily lenient test for the 
review of compelled commercial speech.  It held that commercial speech 
could be compelled so “long as disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”26  
This standard for compelling commercial speech was far weaker than the 
Central Hudson test that applied to restrictions on commercial speech: 
We reject appellant’s contention that we should subject 
disclosure requirements to a strict “least restrictive 
means” analysis under which they must be struck down 
if there are other means by which the State’s purposes 
may be served.   Although we have subjected outright 
prohibitions on speech to such analysis, all our 
discussions of restraints on commercial speech have 
recommended disclosure requirements as one of the 
acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual 
                                                 
22 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
23 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
24 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
25 Id.  Although the Court minimized the interests of a commercial speaker, it did not 
entirely deny them: 
Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have 
emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more 
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on 
speech, “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately 
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion 
or deception.” 
Id.  It is striking that in the context of public discourse compelling speech is frequently 
regarded as less acceptable than prohibiting speech. 
26 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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suppression of speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric, 447 U.S., at 565, 100 S.Ct., at 2351.   Because the 
First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure 
requirements are substantially weaker than those at 
stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not 
think it appropriate to strike down such requirements 
merely because other possible means by which the State 
might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized.27    
Zauderer’s holding that restrictions on commercial speech should be 
more stringently reviewed than compulsions to engage in commercial 
speech follows directly from the Court’s understanding of the 
constitutional value of commercial speech.  Because restrictions on 
commercial speech threaten to diminish the “‘free flow of commercial 
information,’”28 whereas compulsions to speak increase the flow of that 
information, the latter actually advances the constitutional value 
attributed to commercial speech.  The state’s interest in avoiding 
potential deception follows directly from the need to ensure “that the 
stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly. . . .”29  Insofar as the 
constitutional value of commercial speech derives from the 
informational benefits of this flow, state compulsions to engage in 
commercial speech do not compromise constitutionally protected 
interests possessed by commercial speakers.   
Within public discourse, by contrast, the First Amendment ascribes 
constitutionally valuable interests to speakers,30 which is why the Court 
in cases like Barnette and Wooley rigorously scrutinized mandated forms 
of participation within public discourse.  Zauderer specifically and 
explicitly emphasizes the distinction between commercial speech and 
                                                 
27 Id. at 651 n.14.  The Court continued: 
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument that a 
disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is “under-inclusive”—
that is, if it does not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to 
ameliorate.  As a general matter, governments are entitled to attack 
problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so 
fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied. . . .  The right of a 
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his 
services is not such a fundamental right. 
Id. 
28 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
Citizens v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). 
29 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 
at 771–72). 
30 Robert Post, 1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law:  I. Constitutional Law: Equality and 
Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997). 
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public discourse by holding that a commercial speaker’s constitutional 
interest in not being compelled to provide “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information”31 is “minimal.”32  The Court would surely 
not characterize as “minimal” the constitutional interests of participants 
in public discourse, like the New York Times, to refuse to publish accurate 
factual information to supplement what the government might regard as 
a potentially misleading editorial.33 
“A vast regulatory apparatus in both the federal government and the 
states . . . to control . . . potentially misleading or deceptive speech”34 has 
been erected on the foundation of Zauderer.  This apparatus routinely 
compels commercial speech by requiring commercial speakers to 
disclose information to consumers.35  There are many reasons for 
mandating the disclosure of commercial information.  Sometimes, as in 
Zauderer, disclosures are compelled in order to prevent potential 
deception.  But frequently the disclosure of information is required in 
order to promote transparent and efficient markets.36  To tamper with 
                                                 
31 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
32 Id. 
33 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
34 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 153. 
35 For a sample of the many recent cases affirming compelled disclosures under 
Zauderer, see, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding order 
requiring peddlers of suspect tax advice to post a copy of an injunction issued against them 
on their web site); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(upholding a requirement that lightbulb manufacturers disclose the mercury content of 
their products because “Zauderer, not Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n . . . describes the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First 
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases”); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. 
Supp. 2d 1296, 1304 (D. Utah 2003) (concluding that the disclosure requirement of 17(b) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 is constitutional because “[t]hough Central Hudson applies to 
statutes that restrict commercial speech, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel discusses 
the distinction between statutes mandating disclosures versus statutes prohibiting 
speech”); and Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506, 520 
(Tenn. 2002) (upholding regulation that compelled a telephone service provider to list its 
competitors on the cover of the phonebook because “under current law—as announced in 
Zauderer—as long as the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s interest 
in preventing deception of consumers, and not unduly burdensome, it should be upheld”). 
36 See, e.g., David S. Rudner, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs 
After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 64 (2005) (discussing the 
benefits to market efficiency of the SEC’s required disclosure rules).  The SEC, for example, 
requires broker-dealers to make comprehensive disclosures about the risks of investing in 
order to provide investors with “market transparency.”  O. Dennis Hernandez, Jr., Broker-
Dealer Regulation Under the New Penny Stock Disclosure Rules: An Appraisal, 1993 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 27, 29.  A similar rationale lies behind mandatory disclosure rules for credit 
card companies. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him . . . .”).  See also infra notes 133–35. 
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Zauderer’s understanding of compelled commercial speech is thus to 
trouble the foundations of pervasive and well-established regulatory 
regimes that presently govern American markets and protect American 
consumers.  When the Court sought to address the question of 
compelled subsidization commercial speech in United Foods, it was 
intervening into a complex regulatory environment that had been 
established in reliance on the Court’s own precedent.  
It is true that Zauderer concerned compelled commercial speech, 
whereas United Foods addressed the seemingly distinct question of 
compelled subsidization of commercial speech.  But in the contexts we 
are considering, the First Amendment values at stake in the compelled 
subsidization of speech derive from the First Amendment values at stake 
in compulsions to speak.  If circumstances are such that it would not be 
unconstitutional to compel someone to speak, as for example to testify 
before a legislature, it would also not be unconstitutional to compel them 
to subsidize that speech.37  For purposes of comparing Zauderer with 
United Foods, therefore, we can analyze the constitutional questions 
raised by compelled subsidization of commercial speech in terms of the 
constitutional issues raised by compelled commercial speech.     
II.  COMPELLED ASSOCIATION BEFORE UNITED FOODS 
United Foods also intervened into what had long been settled doctrine 
in the area of compelled association.  The Court first began to develop 
doctrine theorizing the connection between compelled association and 
the compelled subsidization of groups in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.38  Abood held that serious First Amendment questions were 
raised by a state law creating an agency shop in which all employees 
were required to pay to the union that was their collective bargaining 
agent a fee that was equal in amount to union dues.  These First 
Amendment questions concerned the right of employees not to be 
compelled to subsidize the ideological speech of an expressive 
association like a union. 
Abood did not argue that the speech of the union would be attributed 
to the dissident employees who were compelled to contribute fees to the 
union.  Instead Abood invoked the Court’s decision the previous year in 
                                                 
37 Another way to make this point is that speech is often expensive because it consumes 
resources like time and energy, and in such circumstances to compel persons to speak is the 
same as to compel them to subsidize speech. 
38 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
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Buckley v. Valeo,39 which had held “that contributing to an organization 
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First 
Amendment.”40  Abood decided that by parity of reasoning “[t]o compel 
employees financially to support their collective-bargaining 
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests.  An 
employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of 
activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive 
representative.”41 
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, 
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for 
political purposes works no less an infringement of their 
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First 
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be 
free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s 
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience 
rather than coerced by the State.  
. . . . 
These principles prohibit a State from compelling any 
individual to affirm his belief in God, . . . or to associate 
with a political party, . . . as a condition of retaining 
public employment. They are no less applicable to the 
case at bar, and they thus prohibit the appellees from 
requiring any of the appellants to contribute to the 
support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a 
condition of holding a job as a public school teacher.42 
Abood argued that because Buckley had held that First Amendment 
issues were raised by restrictions of “support of an ideological cause,” so 
constitutional issues would be raised by compelled support for such a 
cause.  Buckley had upheld restrictions on contributions to political 
candidates if the government was able to advance a sufficiently 
important state purpose, such as “the prevention of corruption and the 
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive 
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on 
their actions if elected to office.”43 Abood analogously upheld compelled 
                                                 
39 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
40 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234. 
41 Id. at 222. 
42 Id. at 234–35. 
43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
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contributions to unions if the government was able to advance a 
sufficiently important state purpose, such as promoting “peaceful labor 
relations to permit a union and an employer to conclude an agreement 
requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union representation to 
share its cost.”44  Because the state had no interest in compelling persons 
to contribute to “ideological activities unrelated to collective 
bargaining,”45 Abood held that compulsory dues could not be used to 
support ideological speech that was “not germane to collective 
bargaining.”46  This is the origin of Abood’s well-known “germaneness 
test.” 
The Court subsequently reaffirmed Abood’s analysis in Keller v. State 
Bar of California,47 which interpreted Abood to rest on the premise “that 
just as prohibitions on making contributions to organizations for political 
purposes implicate fundamental First Amendment concerns, . . . 
compelled . . . contributions for political purposes work no less an 
infringement of . . . constitutional rights.’”48  Keller applied the doctrinal 
structure established by Abood to hold that lawyers could be compelled 
to contribute dues to an integrated state bar so long as these dues were 
used to fund only “activities . . . germane to” the “purpose for which 
compelled association was justified:  . . . the State’s interest in regulating 
the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.”49  The 
dues could not be used to “fund activities of an ideological nature which 
fall outside of those areas of activity.”50   
Latent in Abood, however, was a subtle ambiguity.  Compelling 
dissident employees to pay dues to a union does not require them 
merely to support the speech of the union.  It also forces them to affiliate 
with the union, which is itself a distinct expressive association.  Abood 
briefly recognized this point when it noted that compelled union dues 
raised the question of “an employee’s freedom to associate for the 
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.”51  The 
mandated union dues at issue in Abood thus threatened two distinct First 
Amendment rights:  freedom of speech and freedom of association.     
                                                 
44 Abood, 431 U.S. at 219.  In essence, Abood held that compelled association was required 
to preclude the possibility that employees who otherwise received the benefits of 
unionization could “free ride” on the union’s collective bargaining power. 
45 Id. at 236. 
46 Id. at 219. 
47 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
48 Id. at 9–10. 
49 Id. at 13–14. 
50 Id. at 14. 
51 Abood, 431 U.S. at 222. 
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At one level, these two separate rights are interrelated because First 
Amendment rights of freedom of association derive from constitutional 
rights of freedom of speech.52  First Amendment rights of association 
protect the “ability and the opportunity to combine with others to 
advance one’s views.”53  “The Court has recognized a right to associate 
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, 
and the exercise of religion.”54  State regulation of association raises 
constitutional concerns when it restricts the capacity of persons to 
associate “for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious 
activities.”55   
It follows that there is no First Amendment right to associate in 
order to engage in forms of speech that are not protected by the First 
Amendment.  Ordinary restrictions on the purchase of corporate stock, 
for example, do not infringe First Amendment rights of association.  The 
scope of First Amendment rights of association thus depend upon the 
forms of speech that are protected by the First Amendment.   
The First Amendment paradigmatically safeguards speech that 
embodies values associated with democratic legitimation.56  I have used 
the label “public discourse” to designate speech that embodies these 
values.57  Just as the First Amendment protects the ability of persons to 
                                                 
52 First Amendment rights of freedom of association are distinct from due process rights 
of association, which protect “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human 
relationships . . . against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such 
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional 
scheme.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).  These forms of intimate 
association receive “protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”  Id. at 618. 
53 N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).  See Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1311–12 (2006): 
We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate for the 
purpose of speaking . . . .  The reason we have extended First 
Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often 
exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of 
others. . . .  If the government were free to restrict individuals’ ability 
to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the 
First Amendment is intended to protect. 
54 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
55 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987). 
56 See Post, supra note 16, at 9–10; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254–55 (1995); see also JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, 
AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 12–16, 43–49 (1999); James Weinstein, 
Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. 
Kasky, 54. CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1094–10 (2004). 
57 Robert Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 481 (1997). 
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participate in public discourse so as to render public opinion responsive 
to their views, so the First Amendment protects the ability of persons to 
participate in public discourse by joining together to amplify their views 
in order to make them more effective.  Because there is a First 
Amendment right not to be forced to speak within public discourse,58 the 
Court has also concluded that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”59  To require persons to 
associate against their will with organizations that seek to influence 
public opinion is to undermine the value of democratic legitimation by 
frustrating the aspiration of persons to render public opinion responsive 
to their own views.   
Although rights of speech and association are interdependent, they 
are also analytically distinct, as can be seen in Abood itself.  Labor unions 
are organizations with ideological purposes and messages, so that First 
Amendment rights of association attach to their formation.60  First 
Amendment concerns are therefore triggered by requiring dissident 
employees to affiliate with labor unions, whether or not the dues of 
dissident employees are used to support the specifically ideological 
speech of unions.  The right not to associate with a union, and the right 
not to support its ideological speech, are logically separate issues.   
The Court began doctrinally to recognize this distinction in Ellis v. 
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerk.61  The puzzle faced by 
Ellis was how to distinguish union activities that could be supported by 
compulsory dues from those activities that could not.  Ellis began its 
analysis of the problem with the premise that “by allowing the union 
shop at all, we have already countenanced a significant impingement on 
First Amendment rights” because the “dissenting employee is forced to 
support financially an organization with whose principles and demands 
he may disagree.”62  Ellis concluded that compelled dues could 
constitutionally be sustained only insofar as unions acted to advance 
purposes that justified compulsory affiliation.  Ellis identified “the 
governmental interest in industrial peace”63 as such a purpose, and it 
therefore held that “the test must be whether the challenged 
                                                 
58 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
59 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
60 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102–04 
(1940). 
61 466 U.S. 435 (1984). 
62 Id. at 455. 
63 Id. at 456. 
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expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of 
performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in 
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”64  
In this way Ellis moved beyond Abood’s narrow focus on the 
ideological speech of unions and instead began to address the separate 
question of compulsory affiliation.  Ruling that mandatory dues, even if 
spent for non-ideological purposes, nevertheless “involve additional 
interference with the First Amendment interests of objecting employees,” 
Ellis required courts to determine with respect to all such dues “whether 
they are nonetheless adequately supported by a governmental 
interest.”65  The Court consolidated this doctrinal structure in Lehnert v. 
Ferris Faculty Ass’n,66 holding “that chargeable activities must (1) be 
‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the 
government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free 
riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that 
is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.”67   
Ellis and Lehnert articulated a doctrinal structure that protects the 
right of dissident employees not to be compelled to affiliate with unions.  
Mandatory dues are conceived as a form of compulsory affiliation, 
which are permissible only insofar as they are justified by the state’s goal 
of promoting collective bargaining.  The right to be free from coerced 
affiliation is logically distinct from the right of dissident employees not 
to be compelled to subsidize the specific ideological speech of unions.  
The difference is evident in a recent decision like Romero v. Colegio de 
Abogados de Puerto Rico,68 in which the First Circuit struck down an 
integrated bar’s efforts to use compulsory dues to fund mandatory life 
insurance policies.  Although no First Amendment issue of freedom of 
speech is plausibly raised by the use of bar dues to purchase life 
insurance policies, Romero nevertheless held that a bar’s use of 
compulsory dues to purchase life insurance violates the right of dissident 
attorneys not to be compelled to affiliate with the expressive association 
of the bar:  
The very act of the state compelling an employee or an 
attorney to belong to or pay fees to a union or bar 
association implicates that person’s First Amendment 
                                                 
64 Id. at 448. 
65 Id. at 456. 
66 500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
67 Id. at 519. 
68 204 F.3d 291 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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right not to associate. . . .  In both situations, strong 
public interests justify the intrusion, and the 
germaneness test guarantees that these public interests 
are being served by any challenged activity.  Compelling 
financial support for activities wholly unrelated to those 
public interests, however, changes the balance and 
weakens the justification that supported the intrusion on 
First Amendment associational interests in the first 
place.  Simply stated, that an individual may be 
compelled to associate and financially contribute for 
some purposes does not mean she may be compelled to 
associate and financially contribute for all purposes. . . .  
Without this germaneness check, once a person is 
compelled to join and support a bar association for 
legitimate reasons, she could be forced to pay for any 
bar activity for any reason or no reason, as long as it did 
not involve political or ideological expression.69 
By the time of United Foods, therefore, the Court had held that 
constitutional questions of coerced affiliation would arise whenever 
persons were forced to subsidize “expressive” organizations like unions 
or bar associations.  Organizations were deemed “expressive” whenever 
they engaged in “protected speech.”70  Persons could be compelled to 
associate with expressive associations only insofar as the affiliation was 
“germane” to a state purpose that was sufficiently important to justify 
coerced affiliation.  The Court used the “germaneness test” of Abood to 
protect the distinct right of freedom of association. 
                                                 
69 Id. at 301.  Romero should be contrasted with a decision like Popejoy v. New. Mexico 
Board of Bar Commissioners, 887 F. Supp. 1422 (D.N.M. 1995), which, by focusing sharply on 
freedom of speech as distinct from association, rejected a lawyer’s claim that his Bar’s 
“acquisition of excess office space” was a violation of the First Amendment.  “Construction 
of a building or maintenance of excess space are activities with no communicative value 
and expressing no ideological or political viewpoint; as such, they do not meaningfully 
implicate the core First Amendment principle of preventing compelled ideological 
conformity.” Id. at 1429.  Popejoy did not appreciate the distinction between compelled 
speech and compelled association, a distinction that came increasingly into focus in the 
development of the Court’s doctrine between Abood and Lehnert. 
70 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987). 
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III.  THE INNOVATIONS OF UNITED FOODS 
A. Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott 
In 1997 the Court revisited questions of compelled commercial 
speech and coerced affiliation in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott,71 
which was a suit brought by producers of California summer fruits.  
Glickman involved the constitutionality of marketing orders promulgated 
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937.72  The Act created forms of comprehensive 
economic regulation “in order to establish and maintain orderly 
marketing conditions and fair prices. . . .”73  Displacing “competition” 
and explicitly exempting producers from antitrust laws, the Act 
authorized mechanisms that created uniform prices, limited the quality 
and the quantity of commodities, specified the grades and sizes of 
commodities, sanctioned joint research and development projects, and 
established standardized packaging requirements.74  It imposed 
mandatory assessments on producers of California summer tree fruits, 
which were used by the Nectarine Administrative Committee and the 
Peach Commodity Committee to subsidize generic advertisements for 
these products.  Plaintiffs in the case were producers of California 
summer fruits who were subject to the assessments.  They argued that 
the First Amendment prohibited compulsory fees for the purpose of 
subsidizing “generic advertising.”75    
In a five-to-four opinion authored by Justice Stevens,76 the Court 
rejected plaintiffs’ claim.  Glickman refused to regard the mandatory 
assessments as involving compelled commercial speech.  It reasoned that 
because the mandatory assessments did not require plaintiffs 
“themselves to speak, but . . . merely . . . to make contributions for 
advertising,”77 “our compelled speech case law . . . is clearly inapplicable 
to the regulatory scheme at issue here.”78   
                                                 
71 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
72 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(I) (2000). 
73 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 462. 
76 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. 
77 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471.  The Court noted that the mandatory assessments “do not 
compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech.” Id. at 469. 
The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require 
respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own 
mouths, cf. Barnette, . . . require them to use their own property to 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/1
2006] Transparent and Efficient Markets 571 
Glickman refused to interpret Abood as holding that the compelled 
subsidization of speech was constitutionally equivalent to compelled 
speech.  Glickman instead read Abood to address the question of 
compelled affiliation with an expressive association.  “Abood, and the 
cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First Amendment right not 
to be compelled to provide financial support for any organization that 
conducts expressive activities.  Rather, Abood merely recognized a First 
Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an 
organization whose expressive activities”79 would “engender any crisis 
of conscience.”80  Because the advertisements authorized by the 
Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity 
Committee did “not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any 
political or ideological views,”81 the mandatory assessments did not 
require plaintiffs to affiliate with an expressive association.82   
In effect, Glickman held that although there was a First Amendment 
right to refuse to affiliate with an association that participates in public 
discourse, there was no First Amendment right to refuse to affiliate with 
an association that engaged merely in commercial speech.  The First 
Amendment extended only “minimal constitutional protection” to “the 
freedom of commercial association.”83  The mandatory assessments were 
simply “a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the same 
                                                                                                             
convey an antagonistic ideological message, cf. Wooley, . . . force them 
to respond to a hostile message when they “would prefer to remain 
silent,” . . . or require them to be publicly identified or associated with 
another’s message, cf. PruneYard. . . .  Respondents are not required 
themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for 
advertising.  With trivial exceptions on which the court did not rely, 
none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which 
respondents disagree.  Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to 
them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or “California 
Summer Fruits.” 
Id. at 470–71. 
78 Id. at 470. 
79 Id. at 471. 
80 Id. at 472. 
81 Id. at 469–70. 
82 “The collective programs authorized by the marketing order do not, as a general 
matter, impinge on speech or association rights.”  Id. at 473 n.16.  Cf. Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634, 635 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (finding that there are “only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of 
commercial association” and that an association whose “activities are not predominantly of 
the type protected by the First Amendment” is subject to “rationally related state 
regulation of its membership”). 
83 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 473 n.16 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634–35 
(1984) (Opinion of O’Connor, J.)). 
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strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments 
made by Congress.”84   
Although Glickman explicitly held that the mandatory assessments 
did not impinge on First Amendment rights of speech or association,85 it 
also, and somewhat mysteriously, applied the “germaneness” test of 
Abood: 
[R]ather than suggesting that mandatory funding of 
expressive activities always constitutes compelled 
speech in violation of the First Amendment, our cases 
provide affirmative support for the proposition that 
assessments to fund a lawful collective program may 
sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection 
of some members of the group.86 
Mandatory funding of “expressive activities” was constitutional, 
Glickman ruled, if “germane” to a sufficiently important state purpose.  
Because the purpose of the marketing orders was to maintain stable and 
orderly markets, and because “the generic advertising of California 
peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to” that purpose,87 
Glickman concluded that the mandatory assessments were constitutional.  
Glickman thus offered three logically distinct and independent 
justifications for its holding.  It reasoned that First Amendment rights of 
freedom of speech were not implicated by the mandatory assessments 
because compelled subsidization of speech is different from compelled 
speech.  It argued that First Amendment rights of freedom of association 
were not infringed because the mandatory assessments, at most, 
established a connection to an organization that was not expressive.  
And it concluded that even if First Amendment rights of compelled 
speech or compelled association were implicated, the mandatory 
assessments were justified because they were germane to a sufficiently 
important state purpose. 
Glickman provoked an aggressive and ambitious dissent by Justice 
Souter, who argued that “laws requiring an individual to engage in or 
                                                 
84 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477.   
85  “The legal question that we address is whether being compelled to fund this 
advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is simply a question 
of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve.”  Id. at 468. 
86 Id. at 472–73; see id. at 483, 487–88 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 473 (majority opinion). 
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pay for expressive activities are reviewed under the same standard that 
applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging in or paying for such 
activities.”88  The idea that the government “may compel subsidization 
for any objectionable message that is not political or ideological,” Souter 
asserted, was “entirely at odds with the principle that speech significant 
enough to be protected at some level is outside the government’s power 
to coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further 
justification.”89  Ignoring if not  flatly contradicting the logic of Zauderer, 
Souter proceeded from the premise that “forced payment for commercial 
speech should be subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny as any 
restriction on communications in that category.”90  Since restrictions on 
commercial speech would be subject to the Central Hudson test, Souter 
applied that test to the mandatory assessments and found them 
wanting.91 
B. United States v. United Foods, Inc. 
Four years after Glickman the Court executed a sharp and 
unexpected volte-face in United States v. United Foods, Inc.,92 which 
involved a challenge to the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and 
Consumer Information Act.93  The Act authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to create a Mushroom Council empowered to impose 
mandatory assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms in order to 
serve the statute’s goals of advancing projects of mushroom promotion, 
research, consumer information, and industry information.94  It was 
“undisputed . . . that most moneys raised by the assessments [were] 
spent for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales.”95  The 
plaintiff, a large agricultural enterprise, alleged that the assessments 
were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  Surprisingly, the 
Court agreed in a six-to-three decision. 
                                                 
88 Id. at 491 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Souter’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, and in part by Justice Thomas.  Thomas, joined by Scalia, 
wrote separately to explain that he had refused to join the passages in Souter’s opinion 
applying the Central Hudson test to determine the constitutionality of the Marketing Orders:  
“I continue to disagree with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test and the discounted 
weight given to commercial speech generally.” Id. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 478. 
91 Id. at 491–504. 
92 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
93 7 U.S.C. §§  6101–12 (2000). 
94 7 U.S.C. § 6104(c)(4) (2000). 
95 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408. 
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Switching his view of the merits from Glickman, Justice Kennedy 
authored the Court’s opinion in United Foods.96  He read Glickman as 
turning entirely on the application of Abood’s germaneness test.  United 
Foods interpreted “the opinion and the analysis of the Court” in Glickman 
as proceeding from “the premise that the producers were bound together 
and required by the statute to market their products according to 
cooperative rules.  To that extent, their mandated participation in an 
advertising program with a particular message was the logical 
concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation.”97  Because in 
Glickman the “producers were bound together in the common venture, 
the imposition upon their First Amendment rights caused by using 
compelled contributions for germane advertising was, as in Abood and 
Keller, in furtherance of an otherwise legitimate program.”98  
United Foods held that the assessments imposed by the Mushroom 
Council, unlike those at issue in Glickman, were “not part of some 
broader regulatory scheme,”99 but were used merely to support the 
advertising itself.100  The assessments in United Foods thus failed Abood’s 
germaneness test. “The expression respondent is required to support is 
not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the 
speech itself; and the rationale of Abood extends to the party who objects 
to the compelled support for this speech.”101   
United Foods explicitly repudiated the central postulate of Glickman, 
which is that the compelled subsidization of speech does not raise First 
Amendment concerns unless the compelled speech is ideological in 
nature.  United Foods announced “that speech need not be characterized 
as political before it receives First Amendment protection,”102 and it 
                                                 
96 Justice Stevens also switched his vote.  Justice Breyer authored a dissent, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg and in part by Justice O’Connor. 
97 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412. 
98 Id. at 414–15. 
99 Id. at 415. 
100 “The only program the Government contends the compelled contributions serve is the 
very advertising scheme in question.”  Id. at 415. 
The program sustained in Glickman differs from the one under review 
in a most fundamental respect.  In Glickman the mandated assessments 
for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting 
marketing autonomy.  Here, for all practical purposes, the advertising 
itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory 
scheme. 
Id. at 411–12. 
101 Id. at 415–16. 
102 Id. at 413.  Stevens wrote separately to explain his own switch: 
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asserted that constitutional scrutiny is triggered whenever persons are 
forced to “subsidize speech with which they disagree”103 or whenever 
“certain individuals” are compelled “to pay subsidies for speech to 
which they object.”104  I have argued elsewhere that this assertion is a 
mistake of the first magnitude,105 and I shall not repeat those arguments 
here.  There are numerous circumstances in which First Amendment 
concerns are not aroused even though persons are required to pay for 
speech with which they disagree.  Attorneys’ fees statutes are obvious 
examples.106   
Quite apart from generic issues of compelled subsidization of 
speech, however, United Foods also addresses the more specific questions 
of compelled subsidization of commercial speech or, alternatively, coerced 
affiliation with an association that engages primarily in commercial 
speech.  United Foods does not clearly distinguish between issues of 
compelled subsidization of speech and issues of compelled affiliation.  
Although this distinction had been clarified in the progression from 
                                                                                                             
As we held in Glickman, Keller, and a number of other cases, . . . a 
compelled subsidy is permissible when it is ancillary, or “germane,” to 
a valid cooperative endeavor.  The incremental impact on the liberty of 
a person who has already surrendered far greater liberty to the 
collective entity (either voluntarily or as a result of permissible 
compulsion) does not, in my judgment, raise a significant 
constitutional issue if it is ancillary to the main purpose of the 
collective program. 
. . . . 
This case, however, raises the open question whether such compulsion 
is constitutional when nothing more than commercial advertising is at 
stake.  The naked imposition of such compulsion, like a naked restraint 
on speech itself, seems quite different to me. We need not decide 
whether other interests, such as . . . health or artistic concerns . . . might 
justify a compelled subsidy like this, but surely the interest in making 
one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his competitors, 
including some who are not required to contribute, is insufficient. 
Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Stevens added a footnote that seems even more 
inconsistent with the logic of Glickman: 
I think it clear that government compulsion to finance objectionable 
speech imposes a greater restraint on liberty than government 
regulation of money used to subsidize the speech of others.  Even in 
the commercial speech context, I think it entirely proper for the Court 
to rely on the First Amendment when evaluating the significance of 
such compulsion. 
Id. at 418 n.*. 
103 Id. at 411. 
104 Id. at 410. 
105 See Post, supra note 11. 
106 See, e.g., Banning v. Newdow, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Abood to Lehnert, it remains obscure in the Glickman-United Foods-Johanns 
trilogy.107  In the remainder of this Lecture, therefore, I shall discuss two 
alternative interpretations of United Foods.  I shall read the decision as 
concerned either with compelled subsidization of speech or with coerced 
affiliation.  In each instance, however, I shall focus on the jurisprudential 
implications of the fact that United Foods involves commercial speech, 
rather than public discourse.  
IV.  UNITED FOODS AND THE COMPELLED SUBSIDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
United Foods rejects Glickman’s distinction between compelled speech 
and the compelled subsidization of speech, and it explains that the 
compelled subsidization of speech raises serious First Amendment 
questions even if the speech at issue is commercial.  This holding puts 
United Foods in serious tension with Zauderer, which at the time was the 
Court’s governing precedent concerning the constitutionality of 
compelled commercial speech.  In Zauderer the Court had held that 
mandatory commercial disclosures implicated only “minimal” First 
Amendment interests.  Zauderer necessarily implied that compelled 
subsidization of these disclosures would also implicate only “minimal” 
First Amendment interests. 
United Foods attempts to distinguish Zauderer on two grounds.  First, 
United Foods argues that the Disciplinary Rule at issue in Zauderer 
applied to “attorneys who advertised by their own choice,”108 and who, 
if they wished, could refrain from advertising at all.  In United Foods, by 
contrast, commercial firms were forced to pay the assessments whether 
they wished to or not.  Second, United Foods argues that in Zauderer the 
state’s concern was to prevent advertisements that were potentially 
misleading.  In United Foods, by contrast, “there is no suggestion . . . that 
the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of private 
persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to make 
voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers.”109   
United Foods’s first proposed ground of distinction is unpersuasive.  
The attorney in Zauderer was forced to disclose commercial information 
as a condition of advertising his legal services.  The commercial speaker 
                                                 
107 Glickman shuffles uneasily between issues of speech and association.  Johanns 
addresses only the question of compelled subsidization of speech; it erroneously reads 
United Foods as entirely concerned with that question. 
108 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416. 
109 Id. 
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in United Foods was forced to subsidize advertisements as a condition of 
its selling mushrooms.  In Zauderer the lawyer could have ceased to 
advertise; in United Foods the commercial firm could have ceased to sell 
mushrooms.  In both cases the requirement of compelled commercial 
speech was imposed as a condition of engaging in commercial activity.  
In neither case was it unconditional.   
The second ground of distinction advanced by United Foods correctly 
identifies a real difference from Zauderer, but the meaning attributed by 
the Court to this difference is obscure.  It is true that the disclosure at 
issue in Zauderer was imposed in order to foreclose the possibility of 
consumer deception, whereas the regulation in United Foods was 
imposed in order to promote the market in mushrooms.  But Zauderer 
did not hold that a commercial speaker’s First Amendment interests 
were “minimal” because the state possessed a powerful interest in 
averting potential deception.  Instead it held that because the 
constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation of 
information, commercial speakers do not possess more than residual 
interests in deciding what kinds of advertisements to promulgate.  This 
conclusion applies as fully to the mushroom producer in United Foods as 
it does to the lawyer in Zauderer.  Within the logic of Zauderer, therefore, 
the commercial speaker in United Foods should possess merely 
“minimal” First Amendment interests, and these interests should easily 
have been overridden by the state’s need to promote and stabilize the 
market in mushrooms.   
United Foods thus implicitly alters the logic of Zauderer.  The holding 
of United Foods can be explained only on the assumption that commercial 
speakers retain significant constitutional interests that are not fully 
captured by the constitutional values inherent in the circulation of 
information.110  Like Souter’s dissent in Glickman, United Foods must 
break with the Court’s traditional explanation of its commercial speech 
doctrine and move from constitutional values that are audience-centered 
to those that are speaker-centered.111  The Court’s subsequent decision in 
                                                 
110 In his dissent in Johanns, Souter explicitly reads United Foods as attributing 
“autonomy” interests to commercial speakers.  Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 
S. Ct. 2055, 2071 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).  Souter’s dissent was joined by Kennedy, the 
author of United Foods, and by Stevens, the author of Glickman. 
111 Such an implicit re-evaluation of the constitutional values in commercial speech might 
explain the increasing severity with which the Court has in recent years applied the Central 
Hudson test.  See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001); Greater New Orleans Bd. Ass’n 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).  It is plain that there is disagreement among the 
Justices joining the Court’s opinion in United Foods about what test should be used to 
Post: Transparent and Efficient Markets:  Compelled Commercial Speech a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
578 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Johanns holds merely that taxes used to support government speech can 
never give rise to First Amendment claims, and it does not in any way 
modify or alleviate this implicit shift. 
V.  UNITED FOODS AND COERCED AFFILIATION WITH AN ASSOCIATION THAT 
ENGAGES IN COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
United Foods invalidates the mandatory assessments of the 
Mushroom Council by applying the germaneness test of Abood.  The use 
of the germaneness test suggests that the question of coerced affiliation 
was constitutionally decisive for United Foods, which asserts that 
“[b]efore addressing whether a conflict with freedom of belief exists, a 
threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed 
obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is 
only the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled 
subsidy for speech in the first place.”112  United Foods explains that 
requiring payments to subsidize the speech of an association is 
constitutional only if “the compelled contribution of moneys to pay for 
expressive activities [is] a necessary incident of a larger expenditure for 
an otherwise proper goal requiring the cooperative activity,”113 and it 
ultimately distinguishes Glickman on the ground that in the latter case 
there was an adequate constitutional justification for “requiring the 
cooperative activity.”  
United Foods’s  reasoning is far from clear.  It might concern the 
structure of plaintiffs’ claim of compelled speech, in which case United 
Foods holds that persons cannot constitutionally be compelled to 
subsidize speech unless the state is justified in forcing them to affiliate 
with an expressive association.114  But this interpretation of United Foods 
                                                                                                             
measure the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech.  In Glickman, Thomas, 
joined by Scalia, had dissented specially to note that: 
I continue to disagree with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test 
and the discounted weight given to commercial speech generally. . . .  
Because the regulation at issue here fails even the more lenient Central 
Hudson test, however, it, a fortiori, would fail the higher standard that 
should be applied to all speech, whether commercial or not. 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
See also supra note 88. 
112 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413.  
113 Id. at 414.  The Court continues:  “The central holding in Keller, moreover, was that the 
objecting members were not required to give speech subsidies for matters not germane to 
the larger regulatory purpose which justified the required association.”  Id. 
114 It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens’ short concurrence explicitly avoids this 
implication.  Stevens reserves the question as to which interests would justify compelled 
contributions for collective advertising.  Stevens concludes only that “surely the interest in 
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is fundamentally implausible.115  In Zauderer commercial disclosures 
were mandated without also requiring “cooperative activity.”  If, as 
Souter argued in his dissent in Glickman, the constitutional standard for 
assessing the mandatory subsidization of commercial speech were to be 
the same Central Hudson test as is used to determine the constitutionality 
of restrictions on commercial speech,116 the Mushroom Act’s goal of 
“maintain[ing] and expand[ing] existing markets and uses for 
mushrooms”117 would plainly meet the Central Hudson requirement of 
substantiality, even though it does not also require “cooperative 
activity.”  Even if five Justices of the Court were prepared to rule, as 
Thomas believes, that “any regulation that compels the funding of 
advertising must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment 
                                                                                                             
making one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his competitors, including 
some who are not required to contribute, is insufficient” to justify compelled contributions 
for speech.  Id. at 418; see supra note 102. 
115 There is no reason to believe that compelled speech can be justified only by co-
operative activity.  We compel persons to report traffic accidents, for example, or to report 
potential public health risks like those involving child abuse, without also requiring 
compulsory affiliation of any kind. 
116 United Foods is deliberately noncommittal on this point.  United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410.  
In his dissent in Glickman, Souter had explicitly argued that the Central Hudson test be 
employed.  Glickman, 521 U.S. at 491–92 (Souter, J., dissenting).  In his dissent in Johanns, by 
contrast, Souter seemed to suggest “that Central Hudson scrutiny is not appropriate in a 
case involving compelled speech rather than restrictions on speech.”  Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2074 n.10 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).  Lower courts 
have reached quite disparate conclusions on this question.  Some courts have held that a 
state regulation that compels speech, rather prohibits it, “tends to [be] less objectionable 
under the First Amendment.”  Walker v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme 
Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tenn. 2001); see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory 
Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506, 519 (Tenn. 2002).  Others have held the reverse, that “the relaxed 
scrutiny of commercial speech . . . provided for by Central Hudson” ought to be 
“inapplicable” “to speech—commercial or otherwise—that is compelled. . . .  It is one thing 
to force someone to close her mouth; it is quite another to force her to become a 
mouthpiece.”  Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 163 (6th Cir. 2003), 
vacated sub nom. Mich. Pork Producers Ass’n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511 
(2005); see also Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 280 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004) (Rendell, J., 
concurring), vacated sub nom. Lovell v. Cochran, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 436 (9th Cir. 1993).  
117 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 421 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer continued: 
As the Mushroom Act’s economic goals indicate, collective promotion 
and research is a perfectly traditional form of government intervention 
in the marketplace.  Promotion may help to overcome inaccurate 
consumer perceptions about a product. . . .  Overcoming those 
perceptions will sometimes bring special public benefits. . . .  And 
compelled payment may be needed to produce those benefits where, 
otherwise, some producers would take a free ride on the expenditures 
of others. 
Id. at 421–22. 
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scrutiny,”118 there are nevertheless “compelling purposes” capable of 
satisfying strict scrutiny that do not also require cooperative activity. 
We thus cannot plausibly interpret United Foods’s use of Abood’s 
germaneness test as addressing plaintiff’s claim of compelled 
subsidization of speech.  It must therefore concern plaintiff’s claim of 
coerced affiliation.  Just as Ellis and Lehnert had conceptualized 
mandatory union dues as compelling affiliation with the expressive 
association of a union, so United Foods evidently conceived the 
mandatory assessments of the Mushroom Council as compelling 
affiliation with the private organization of mushroom producers in 
whose name the mushroom advertisements were issued.119  This 
interpretation of United Foods has the advantage of explaining its 
otherwise mysterious use of Abood’s germaneness test and of 
illuminating why United Foods sought to identify an “overriding 
associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in 
the first place.”120   
The disadvantage of this interpretation of United Foods, however, is 
that it raises disquieting questions about the constitutional definition of 
an expressive association.  The First Amendment right to affiliate or not 
to affiliate with an organization applies only to associations that are 
“expressive,” which is to say only to associations that engage in 
“protected speech.”121  Heretofore all associations deemed expressive, 
like unions or bar associations, were organizations that engaged in 
public discourse.  United Foods is the first decision to conceive an 
                                                 
118 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2066 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
119 The Court in Johanns interpreted United Foods as resting “on the assumption that the 
advertising was private speech, not government speech.”  Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2061; see, 
e.g., Pelts & Skins LLC v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 
2511 (2005).  “The common thread uniting Abood, Keller, Glickman, and United Foods is that 
compelled subsidization of speech is permissible when individuals have been bound into a 
collective association.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
120 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413. 
In Abood, the infringement upon First Amendment associational rights 
worked by a union shop arrangement was “constitutionally justified 
by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the 
union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.”   
To attain the desired benefit of collective bargaining, union members 
and nonmembers were required to associate with one another, and the 
legitimate purposes of the group were furthered by the mandated 
association. 
Id. at 413–14 (internal citations omitted). 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
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association as expressive even though it engages only in commercial 
speech.   
The problem with this interpretation of United Foods is that virtually 
all commercial organizations—all corporations or business 
partnerships—engage in commercial speech.  If an organization is 
deemed expressive merely because it engages in commercial speech, all 
laws regulating affiliation and de-affiliation with business organizations, 
as well as all laws regulating the internal capacity of persons to control 
the commercial speech of such organizations,122 will be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny.  This is plainly untenable. 
It is noteworthy, therefore, that United Foods uses the germaneness 
test of Abood to distinguish commercial associations that exist primarily 
for the purpose of commercial expression, like the Mushroom Council, 
from commercial associations that additionally serve other purposes, like 
the Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity 
Committee.123  This application of the germaneness test implies that First 
Amendment rights of association protect against compelled affiliation 
with commercial associations that primarily engage in commercial 
speech, but not against coerced affiliation with commercial associations 
that also serve other ends.124  
VI.  ASSESSING THE INNOVATIONS OF UNITED FOODS 
United Foods is a highly innovative and consequential decision, 
whether it is read as turning on the idea that the compulsory 
subsidization of commercial speech ought to receive careful 
                                                 
122 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
123 Stevens switched his vote between Glickman and United Foods specifically because he 
concluded that in United Foods “nothing more than commercial advertising is at stake.”  
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
124 Because Johanns conceptualizes United Foods entirely as a compelled speech case, 
Johanns does not address the implicit holding of United Foods that First Amendment 
interests are infringed by compelled affiliation with organizations engaged primarily in 
commercial speech.  It is noteworthy, however, that the “government speech” exception 
which Johanns postulates for the compelled subsidization of speech also makes theoretical 
sense in the context of compelled association.  First Amendment rights cannot be infringed 
by the use of compulsory tax dollars to affiliate persons with the state itself, even with a 
state organization that is primarily engaged in commercial speech.  This is because all 
citizens of a state are already affiliated with their government by virtue of their 
membership in a democratic polity that demands forms of associative solidarity like 
compulsory jury duty, the military draft, and taxes.  It is meaningless to appeal to the First 
Amendment to complain that the state has coercively required affiliation with itself, as 
such affiliation is always already implicit in the obligations of citizenship. 
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constitutional scrutiny, or instead on the idea that the Abood 
germaneness test protects against coerced affiliation with associations 
that engage primarily in commercial speech.  Neither of these 
fundamental innovations of United Foods is in any way affected by 
Johanns.   
The innovations of United Foods are not, in my view, well taken.  
They are largely implicit in the opinion’s structure, and as a consequence 
they are never openly articulated and systematically defended.  When 
rendered explicit, it is plain that they are inconsistent with important 
precedents and threaten to unsettle significant dimensions of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  They are also in deep tension with basic 
principles that inform contemporary regulations of consumer markets.  
Consider, first, United Foods’s view that commercial speakers retain 
significant constitutional interests that must be balanced against state 
interests in compelling the subsidization of commercial speech.  United 
Foods never explains the underlying justification for this view.  If taken to 
its logical conclusion, it might signify that the Court is moving toward 
the position that there is no “philosophical or historical basis for 
asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than 
‘noncommercial’ speech.”125  Justice Thomas has been urging this view 
for some years now.  Any such position would require the Court strictly 
to review the myriad of commercial rules that now regulate the forms of 
communication in which commercial transactions are embedded.  The 
potential for commercial speech doctrine to evolve into this kind of 
Lochnerism was long ago predicted,126 but Thomas seems to regard the 
prospect with undisguised relish:  
Although the Constitution may not “enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics,” and thus the Government has a 
considerable range of authority in regulating the 
Nation’s economic structure, part of the Constitution—
the First Amendment—does enact a distinctly 
individualistic notion of “the freedom of speech,” and 
                                                 
125 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 
628 (1990); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and 
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452–48 (1971); Rodney A. Smolla, 
Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial 
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993). 
126 Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
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Congress may not simply collectivize that aspect of our 
society, regardless of what it may do elsewhere.127   
Of course the likelihood that United Foods signifies such a radical 
shift is quite small.  It is more probable that the Court means to signify 
that commercial speakers retain some interests, although not interests 
that are of equal weight to those of participants in public discourse.  But 
even this more modest innovation can have potentially far-reaching 
practical consequences.  Many of the most fundamental principles of 
contemporary commercial speech doctrine are built on the premise that 
commercial speakers lack strong independent constitutional interests.  
The Court has encouraged states to regulate commercial speech by using 
prior restraints, for example, and this approach, as I have argued 
elsewhere, seems to rely on the assumption that the constitutional value 
of commercial speech lies in the circulation of information rather than in 
the independent interests of commercial speakers.128  The same can be 
said about the Court’s rule that the overbreadth doctrine will not apply 
to commercial speech.129   
In the end, the impact of United Foods on the structure of commercial 
speech doctrine will depend on the exact nature of the interests that the 
Court wishes to attribute to commercial speakers.130  The question is how 
the interests of commercial speakers will be understood to differ from 
the interests ascribed to participants in public discourse.131  The Court 
will not only have to specify the circumstances that enable the interests 
of commercial speakers to prevail, as in United Foods, it will also have to 
articulate the circumstances in which these interests are diminished, as in 
Zauderer.  We cannot begin to predict the effect of United Foods on 
existing doctrine until we have some careful theoretical account of the 
character of the constitutional interests that the Court wishes to attribute 
to commercial speakers. 
It is clear, however, that even if United Foods means that commercial 
speakers retain interests as against compulsory commercial speech only 
when such speech is mandated for reasons other than protecting 
                                                 
127 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 505 n.3 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
128 See Post, supra note 16, at 32–33. 
129 Id. at 29–32. 
130 Even in Zauderer the Court had postulated that commercial speakers retained some 
residual, minimal forms of constitutional interests.  See supra note 25. 
131 See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993). 
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consumers against potential deception,132 United Foods would 
nevertheless imply a potentially broad and destabilizing change in the 
texture of the regulations that presently govern commercial speech.  This 
is because commercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for 
reasons that have little to do with the prevention of deception.   
The Federal Trade Commission now imposes mandatory disclosure 
rules on a wide range of industries, requiring sellers to divulge such 
information as “the durability of light bulbs, octane ratings for gasoline, 
tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, mileage per gallon for automobiles, 
or care labeling of textile wearing apparel.”133  Congress has passed 
innumerable statutes that contain analogous disclosure requirements.134  
These disclosure requirements force commercial speakers to engage in 
commercial speech, but they do not do so merely to prevent potential 
consumer deception.  They primarily seek to reduce information costs 
and thereby to establish a more educated and efficient marketplace.135  
                                                 
132 The narrowest possible interpretation of United Foods is that the case stands for the 
proposition that commercial speakers can be required to speak for any reason other than 
compelling them to subsidize the speech of potential competitors.  Although Stevens’ 
concurrence in United Foods is written so as to gesture toward this narrow conclusion, supra 
note 114, Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United Foods is not.  Kennedy’s opinion 
focuses primarily on the constitutional interests of commercial speakers, rather than on the 
strength of the state’s interests in imposing a regulation. 
133 Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (1977). 
134 Just to offer some few examples enforced by the FTC, the Fair Packaging and Labeling 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–61 (2000), directs the FTC to issue regulations requiring that all 
consumer commodities other than food, drugs, therapeutic devices, and cosmetics be 
labeled to disclose net contents, identity of commodity, and name and place of business of 
the product’s manufacturer, packer, or distributor; the Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2000), requires all creditors who deal with consumers to make 
certain written disclosures concerning all finance charges and related aspects of credit 
transactions (including disclosing finance charges expressed as an annual percentage rate); 
the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68–68j (2000), requires that wool product 
labels indicate the country in which the product was processed or manufactured and that 
mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously state whether a wool product 
was processed or manufactured in the United States or was imported; the Fur Products 
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69–69j (2000), requires that articles of apparel made of fur be 
labeled and that invoices and advertising for furs and fur products specify, among other 
things, the true English name of the animal from which the fur was taken and whether the 
fur is dyed or used; the Textile Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70–70k (2000), 
requires that any textile fiber product processed or manufactured in the United States be so 
identified and that mail order promotional materials clearly and conspicuously indicate 
whether a textile fiber product was processed or manufactured in the United States or was 
imported. 
135 See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(upholding mercury disclosure rule even though “the compelled disclosure at issue here 
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The promotion of transparent markets is a major objective of  
contemporary regulatory regimes.136  Commercial speech is compelled 
for other reasons as well.  Recently, for example, a congressional statute 
was upheld that prohibited telemarketers from abandoning calls to 
consumers.137  In essence the statute sought to increase the accountability 
of telemarketers by preventing them from engaging in “no speech.”138  In 
California commercial vendors cannot sell goods to consumers that 
contain chemicals known to be carcinogenic or to cause reproductive 
toxicity without first providing “clear and reasonable warning.”139  The 
purpose of this mandated warning is not to prevent deception, but to 
avoid unwitting harm.  Does United Foods imply that all these various 
forms of compelled commercial speech are now constitutionally suspect?  
Analogous problems of indeterminacy afflict United Foods if it is 
interpreted as holding that First Amendment rights of association are 
implicated whenever persons are compelled to affiliate with associations 
that primarily engage in commercial speech.  If the Court means to hold 
that all organizations that engage in commercial speech are expressive 
associations, such that First Amendment rights of affiliation and de-
affiliation apply to them, the Court has crafted a rule that threatens to 
constitutionalize much of the law of corporations and business 
organizations.  But if the Court means to cabin these consequences by 
manipulating the distinction between commercial organizations that are 
                                                                                                             
was not intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se, . . . but rather to 
better inform consumers about the products they purchase”). 
[M]andated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information 
does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting 
efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty 
interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First 
Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the 
efficiency of the marketplace of ideas. 
Id. at 115.  See also CFTC v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding disclosure 
rules of the Commodity Exchange Act because “[t]he disclosure requirement at issue here 
was reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing . . . hypothetical 
statistical presentations that, as Congress observed, could lead to inefficiencies in the 
commodities markets that are contrary to the public interest”). 
136 See, e.g., Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule, 43 FED. REG. 59,614, 59,638 (Dec. 21, 
1978) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436) (“By establishing a uniform, minimal set of 
required information, disclosure requirements enhance the efficiency of markets by 
facilitating comparison of competing franchise offerings.”); Daniel D. Rubino, et al., 
Corporate and Securities Law Update, 67 PLI/NY 11, 51 (1999) (“One of the principal goals 
underlying SEC regulation . . . is the fostering of market transparency.”); see also supra note 
36. 
137 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005). 
138 Id. at 341. 
139 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006). 
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primarily engaged in commercial speech and other commercial 
organizations, then the Court must explain the distinction between 
organizations which have the primary purpose of engaging in 
commercial speech, like the Mushroom Council in United Foods, and 
organizations which engage in commercial speech as a consequence of 
pursuing other objectives, like the Nectarine Administrative Committee 
and the Peach Commodity Committee in Glickman.  This distinction is far 
from obvious, and it is noteworthy that there is no analogous distinction 
in the contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence of association 
rights.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,140 for example, the Court held 
that the Boy Scouts were an expressive association without considering 
whether the primary purpose of the Scouts was to engage in public 
speech.  It was enough that the Scouts had a message that they sought to 
convey.   
The uncertainties that bedevil United Foods as a compelled 
association case are analogous to the uncertainties that envelop United 
Foods as a compelled subsidization of speech case.  These two aspects of 
United Foods are theoretically connected because First Amendment rights 
of association derive from the First Amendment rights of speakers.  The 
Constitution protects association rights because association is an 
indispensable method for speakers to amplify their voices.  To recognize 
constitutional rights in commercial speakers, therefore, is to recognize 
the right of commercial speakers to associate to promulgate their speech.  
Commercial organizations can be expressive associations for purposes of 
the First Amendment only if commercial speakers have the right to 
engage in commercial speech, and only if commercial organizations are 
understood as an effective vehicle for the exercise of that right.  This 
suggests that United Foods’s holding that the right to associate or not to 
associate with commercial organizations is protected by the First 
Amendment is but a corollary of its modification of Zauderer to affirm 
that commercial speakers retain more than residual rights.  To theorize 
which commercial organizations should receive constitutional protection 
as expressive associations is to theorize the nature of the rights possessed 
by commercial speakers. 
It is apparent that the Court has not sharply formulated the 
constitutional conception of commercial speakers that it meant to 
advance in United Foods.  With the benefit of time and hindsight, 
however, we can conduct a thought experiment to test what seems to be 
the two innovations of United Foods.  Imagine an advertising firm whose 
                                                 
140 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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primary business is to produce and publish advertisements.  The firm is 
thus like the Mushroom Council at issue in United Foods, because its chief 
business is commercial speech.  Does United Foods imply that such a firm 
is an expressive association so that all regulations concerning affiliation 
and de-affiliation with the firm are subject to rigorous First Amendment 
scrutiny, even if the firm is a publicly held corporation subject to 
ordinary SEC regulation?  Does United Foods imply that strict scrutiny 
should apply to rules regarding entry and departure from the firm, or to 
rules regarding the internal structures by which the firm’s 
communications are determined?   
These questions test both innovations of United Foods.  If the Court is 
unwilling to extend First Amendment rights of association to a firm that 
is entirely dedicated to the publication of commercial speech, we have 
reason to doubt the seriousness with which the Court is committed to the 
proposition that commercial speakers retain constitutionally protected 
rights.  These rights would necessarily include the authority to associate 
together to amplify commercially protected speech.  If the Court is 
unwilling to extend First Amendment rights of association to our 
hypothesized advertising firm, we may ask why it was willing to apply 
Abood’s germaneness test to the Mushroom Council in United Foods.  It is 
true that in United Foods the Court was faced with state requirements that 
persons affiliate with a commercial association, whereas in our thought 
experiment we are imagining state restrictions on such affiliation, but 
why would this distinction be constitutionally pertinent?  After all, the 
First Amendment right not to associate is but a corollary of the First 
Amendment right to associate.  If the latter does not obtain, neither does 
the former. 
Our thought experiment, in short, suggests that the Court may well 
have been wiser to attend to the argument in Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion in United Foods that regulation of commercial organizations does 
not raise First Amendment concerns.  The mandatory assessments of the 
Mushroom Council might most defensibly have been regarded as “a 
form of economic regulation, not ‘commercial speech,’ for purposes of 
applying First Amendment presumptions.”141 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
United Foods is an extraordinary decision.  It tinkers with the logic of 
Zauderer in ways that threaten to unleash unpredictable transformations 
                                                 
141 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 428 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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of existing First Amendment doctrine.  By seeming to relocate the 
constitutional value of commercial speech from the circulation of 
information to the independent interests of speakers, United Foods takes a 
step toward destabilizing existing regimes of market regulation and 
consumer protection in favor of a far-reaching principle that could 
possibly constitutionalize large stretches of corporate and commercial 
law.  Johanns suggests that the Court still has not comprehended the 
potentially grave consequences of United Food’s innovations.  Johanns’s 
embrace of a “government speech” exception to the compelled 
subsidization of speech doctrine advanced in United Foods may resolve 
the agricultural marketing cases, but it nevertheless permits the 
innovations of United Foods to remain embedded within First 
Amendment jurisprudence, where they are certain to spark future 
litigation.  When the Court does finally come face to face with the 
consequences of these innovations, we shall see how willing it is to 
follow the novel principles advanced in United Foods. 
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